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LIBERTY OF THE HIGHER-ORDER WILL:
FRANKFURT AND AUGUSTINE 1
John J. Davenport

In Augustine's early account of good and evil (in On Free Choice of the Will), and
in his story of his own moral struggles (in the Confessions) we find a view similar
to Harry Frankfurt's account of the first and second orders of the will. However,
while Frankfurt thinks that his hierarchical account of the will provides evidence
against the libertarian principle (PAP) that alternative possibilities are required
for a person to be morally responsible for her actions, Augustine's account shows
that this is not so. Rather, Augustine holds that moral responsibility for our character as constituted by our volitional identifications requires alternative possibilities of the higher-order will. Such 'liberty of identification' can be required even
if we reject PAP as a condition on responsibility for outward acts. I explain this
in terms of a tracing-defense of a restricted Hbertarianism based on a principle of
responsibility for character, and I compare the resulting model with Robert
Kane's conception of ultimate responsibility. After responding to Frankfurt's
objection that the order-asymmetry in such a model is implausible or unmotivated, I argue that such a model is immune from traditional or non-global
Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP-type principles.

In two famous articles, Harry Frankfurt developed and defended the com-

paiibilist position that alternate possibilities of action are not required for
moral responsibility.2 Yet, as I will argue, Frankfurt's analysis of the will is
closely related to St. Augustine's early work, which is the main classical
source of the libertarian doctrine that a morally responsible agent must be
able to do or will otherwise than she did. While Frankfurt's ideas about
autonomy can help in understanding Augustine, Augustine's early position on good, evil, and responsibility for character also poses a unique challenge to Frankfurt's views on the freedom required for moral responsibility. This challenge has not been widely recognized in the burgeoning literature influenced by and responding to Frankfurt's insights/ but it forms a
powerful version of what I have recently called the "tracing defense" of
alternative-possibility requirements for moral responsibility: Developing
these implications shows that Augustine's early account offers a novel libertarian corrective to Frankfurt's model.
1. Frankfurt's Hierarchical Model of the Will

Harry Frankfurt's main debt to the Augustinian tradition is found in his
volitionalist account of personhood, which was developed in response to
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mid-20th-century theories that reduced personhood to a combination of
consciousness, rational judgment, and embodiment. In response to Peter
Strawson in particular, in his 1971 paper, "The Freedom of the Will and the
Concept of a Person," Frankfurt argued that persons are distinguished
from other animals by their capacity for what he calls "second-order volitions." He defined an agent's first-order will as "the desire (or desires) by
which he is motivated in some action he performs or... the desires by which
he will or would be motivated if or when he acts" (p.14).5 To clarify this,
we may say that a first-order motive in general is a subjective mental state
that inclines the agent to some act which does not have mental states of the
agent herself as its end or goal. In other words, first-order motives are outwardly directed practical attitudes, aimed at ends external to the agent's
psyche. In contrast, Frankfurt explains that a second-order volition is the
will to act on one kind of first-order motive rather than another. As
Frankfurt first formulated it, a second-order volition is the will to have a
certain first-order desire be the effective motive if or when one acts (p.1S).
Thus if we think of this 'effective motive' more specifically as the maxim or
intention in terms of which an agent free from self-deception would understand her own behavior as an act, then a second-order volition can also be
understood as the will to be moved to one kind of intentional act as
opposed to others, or to adopt one kind of maxim for action. More generally, second-order volitions are reflexive in nature: they aim at an end or
goal that concerns the agent's own first-order motivational states.
Frankfurt believes that such higher-order volitions explain the phenomenon which he famously calls identifying with a motive, or with a kind of
character. "Identification," in its special Frankfurtian volitional sense, refers
to the intrapersonal experience of striving to become one kind of person
rather than another: it involves working on the social self or outward character that one presents to the world. The person who identifies with a motive
or reason for acting in a particular way experiences this motive as her own,
or as authored by her. As opposed to a "wanton" who (like non-human
animals) "does not care about his will" (p.16), someone who is a "person" in
the full sense has second-order volitions and is therefore not neutral or
unconcerned about the will on which she acts. Rather, she identifies with one
desire over others as the one she wants to be her first-order will. Frankfurt
gives as an example an "unwilling addict" who "identifies himself,
... through the formation of a second-order volition" with the desire to
refrain from taking drugs, even though he still acts on his craving for the
drugs (p.18). Thus, on this account, identifying with a first-order motive,
and in the process "alienating" other conflicting first-order desires on which
one might act, both occur through the formation of second-order volitions. 6
This analysis leads Frankfurt to two important conclusions. (1) In various circumstances, the first-order will that is constitutive of the act (i.e. the
motive or maxim that gives the act its intentional meaning) may involve an
intention with which we do not identify in the deeper personal sense, an
intention that our inward self rejects in its second-order volitions. (2) And
when we identify with the first-order motive on which we act, it need not
be agent-caused for us to be morally responsible for our action. Frankfurt
illustrates the second point by contrasting the unwilling addict with a
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"willing addict." While the former is "helplessly violated by his own
desires," and therefore presumably has diminished moral responsibility
for his act (like someone acting intentionally but under duress), the latter
willingly identifies with his irresistible craving for heroin, and is thus fully
responsible for his action even though the addiction may have begun by
accident, and now he cannot act otherwise:
His [first-order] will is outside his control, but by his second-order
desire that his desire for the drug should be effective, he has made
this will his own (p.25).
Thus identification with the first-order will WI that is causally operative in
our behavior (making that behavior an action) is sufficient for moral
responsibility for our action, even though the higher-order volition may
not have caused the act or brought it about that WI was the motive on which
we acted.
Frankfurt regards the willing addict and similar "over-determination"
cases as counterexamples to the "principle of alternative possibilities"
(PAP), different versions of which say (simplifying somewhat) that an
agent is responsible for some X (a decision, intention, act or consequence)
only if he had the power to bring about some significant alternative to X.
Frankfurt's rejection of Augustinian liberum arbitrium as a condition for
moral responsibility has led to a considerable and ongoing debate in recent
literature focusing on whether Frankfurt-cases constitute real counterexamples to various possible versions of PAP, and if so, whether they also
prove that responsibility is compatible with complete psychophysical
determinism (in which all relevant future events are entailed by the laws of
nature together with the past). But this debate has largely overlooked a
crucial point that Augustine's ideas illustrate: the hierarchical analysis of
volition by itself is still compatible with a libertarian account of the conditions of moral responsibility. The merits of this combination have not been
fully explored, but deserve serious consideration.

II. Augustine's Hierarchical Conception of Good and Evil in the Will
Although he conceives the faculty somewhat differently than Frankfurt,
Augustine also considers our will to be the distinguishing feature of
human personhood, and he regards the agent's will as the center of her
individual identity. In his De Libera Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will),
Augustine insists that the person's seifis most closely or authentically identified with his will: "If the will by which I choose or refuse things is not
mine, then I don't know what I can call mine."7 Frankfurt's account of
autonomy, which developed from his hierarchical analysis of the will, also
requires that acts of volitional identification count as expressions of the
agent's true self: unlike first-order motives, which can persist even when
they are rejected by the higher-order will, the agent eo ipso identifies with
the reflexive process or state of will that identifies him with a first-order
motive. In other words, higher-order volitions are inalienable as long as
they constitute identifications."
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Likewise, while Augustine never uses the language of second-order
volitions, the notion is implicit in his early analysis of good and evil. In
Book I of On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine focuses on the motives
behind immoral actions, arguing that "evildoing" is always motivated by a
perverse or "inordinate desire" for temporal or worldly goods whose possession depends partly on chance and fortune, i.e. "things that cannot be
possessed without fear of losing them."9 In other words, Augustine holds
that evildoing consists in acting on a certain unrestrained form of 'firstorder will,' namely one that desires material and social goods to an inordinate degree, or even at the cost of unjust harm to others. to Thus when
Augustine argues later that "only the will and free choice can make the
mind a companion of cupidity" or inordinate desires,l! he is implying that
we begin to act on such desires only because we freely accept or identify
with them: whether we are reflectively aware of this or not, we will that an
inordinate desire become the first-order intention on which we act.
Augustine believes that we form higher-order volitions through which we
actively help to shape our operative motives, accepting or even cultivating
the motivational force that certain desires have for us, while resisting or
working to break down the motivational force of other incentives.
This becomes particularly clear in the third book of On Free Choice of the
Will, when Augustine's student Evodius asks "why that nature sinned which
God foresaw would sin" and adds that he wants more than the explanation
that it sins by free choice, since he is "looking for the cause of the will itself."12
Augustine first responds that the search for such a cause would lead to an
infinite regress, and so choice of one option over others cannot have any sufficient or determining cause outside the will itself.13 But Evodius's question
can be understood not as asking for such an external explanation, but rather
as seeking some account of the motive internal to the evil higher-order will,
or the basis for the choice(s) through which inordinate desires become our
dominant motives. Augustine eventually faces this deeper question when
he considers the relation between will and reason. He says:
Only something that is seen can incite the will to act. We control
whether we accept or reject whatever we see, but we do not control
what we see. Therefore, we must acknowledge that the soul as a
rational substance sees both superior and inferior things; from either
class it chooses what it wills ... 14
The will must have objects or ends that it does not create. So it might seem
that the evil will just chooses to pursue the lower goods as if they had an
absolute value, even when pursuit of them conflicts with the higher goods.
Yet why would anyone willingly choose what they perceive to be the lesser
good, especially if they did not already desire it inordinately, as Augustine
believes must have been the case with Adam before the fall, or with the
Devil before his fall? At this level, what we need is some account of the
motive or basis of the higher-order volition to desire the inferior goods
unconditionally, or even at the cost of eternal goods of the soul.
Augustine's final answer is that the object of this evil higher-order volition is the agent's own self. Adam identifies with desire for the temporal
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goods out of a "pride that turns one away from wisdom .... And what is the
source of this turning away, if not that someone whose good is God wants
to be his own good, as if he were his own God."!S Likewise, Satan's rebellion involves willing to put himself in God's place, and what first suggests
this to him is his mind's perception that he is a different being than God.!6
Here it is clear that an evil will involves more than simply inordinate firstorder desire for temporal goods. At least in first sin, it must also involves
the higher-order volition to reject divine authority, or to overvalue lesser
goods just because we want to determine for ourselves which goods are
more or less valuable independently of God's will and law. Thus evil
begins in rebellious obstinacy and pride in the higher-order wilp7
The same notion of a higher-order volition standing above our given
first-order motives is implicit in Augustine's later accounts of moral psychology, where he argues that memory, understanding, and will are capable of applying reflexively to one another and to themselves:
... For I remember that I have memory, and understanding, and will;
and I understand that I understand, and will, and remember; and I
will that I will, and remember, and lmderstand ... !8
In Free Choice of the Will, the related claim that nothing "is so much in the
power of the will as the will itself"'Y occurs in the context of an argument
that "it is up to our own will" whether or not we enjoy a "good will."
Augustine defines a good will as one "by which we desire to live upright
and honorable lives and to attain the highest wisdom."20 Like the evil will,
the good will so conceived involves higher-order volitions. It does not just
consist in acting on ordinate first-order desires (which we might call 'gooddoing' as the opposite of evil-doing). Rather, the good will involves the
second-order volition that identifies with ordinateness of our proper firstorder motives. The good person endorses and works to cultivate such
motives because of their goodness. The inward state of moral uprightness
or rectitudo of will in the Augustinian tradition -which was reinterpreted
by Kant as "the motive of duty"- thus consists in a form of second-order
volition that responds to a moral judgment about the worth of different
sorts of first-order motive. 21
These examples show that for Augustine, moral worth depends primarily on
the state of our higher-order will: although everyone naturally has "the will to
be happy" and thus desires goods that appear likely to contribute to their
well-being, good or morally worthy persons are distinguished by "the will to
live rightly,"n or their rectitude in willing to act only on desires that are neither
unjust nor inappropriate in the situation.23 Likewise, an evil will requires volitional identification with perverse first-order motives; it is the second-order
will in which "someone chooses to descend from the heights of wisdom and
become a slave to inordinate desires." 24 Thus Augustine's conception of
"wilt" as opposed to mere bodily action, is like higher-order volition in
Frankfurt's sense: it is a reflexive commitment to being a particular kind of
character, or to becoming a particular sort of person. 25
We see this even more clearly in Augustine's famous description of his
struggles with himself in the Confessions. For example, in recounting his
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desire to follow Victorinus's example and commit himself to the Christian
God, Augustine writes:
...but I was held fast, not in fetters clamped upon me by another, but
by my own will, which had the strength of iron chains. The enemy
held my will in his power and from it he had made a chain and shackled me. For my will was perverse and lust had grown from it, and
when I gave in to lust habit was born, and when I did not resist the
habit it became a necessity ... But the new will which had come to life in
me and made me wish to serve you freely and enjoy you, my God,
who are our only certain joy, was not yet strong enough to overcome
the old, hardened as it was by the passage of time. So these two wills
within me, one old, one new, one the servant of the flesh, the other of
the spirit, were in conflict, and between them they tore my soul
apart....In this warfare, I was on both sides, but I took the part of that

which I approved in myself rather than the part of that which I disapproved.
For my true self was no longer on the side of which I disapproved, since to a
great extent, I was now its reluctant victim, rather than its willing toof.26
In this passage, up to the italicized point, the description suggests two
opposed forces of the same kind, or two states on a metaphysical par with
one another, although the older one is more entrenched. But in the italicized portion this changes, and the description suggests that above these
two desires stands a higher-order volition representing Augustine himself,
by which he identifies with the kind of motive that he judges to be morally
superior. Yet, as in some of Frankfurt's examples, this second-order volition does not immediately cause him to act on ordinate rather than concupiscent first-order desires. So, in language that clearly anticipates
Frankfurt's, Augustine then describes himself as the "victim" of this habitual disposition that controls his acts, although he no longer identifies with
it. As we see later, this is partly because his new second-order volition
itself is not yet entirely "wholehearted;" it is not yet a decisive commitment. 27 Eleonore Stump recognizes the same halfheartedness in
Augustine's infamous prayer that God make him chaste, "but not yet." As
she suggests, we can regard sincere prayer for a change in motive as an
expression of the agent's higher-order volition. When such a prayer)s less
than wholehearted, it is because the higher-order will remains weak. 6
Since good and evil wills involve contrasting states of higher-order volition for Augustine, the freedom to tum from a good will towards and evil
will, and visa-versa, ultimately resides in the power to form volitional identifications. When Augustine says that it is "up to us" whether we have a
good will, this implies a requirement of alternative possibilities for the higher-order will itself. Thus he says, "If the movement of the will were not voluntary and under its own control, a person would not deserve praise for
turning to higher things or blame for turning to lower things, as if swinging
on the hinge of the will."29 This hinge metaphor clearly indicates a libertarian freedom (in the proper alternative-possibilities sense)30 which explains
the human will's 'intermediate' nature between good and evil. Since the
inner character of this will that turns us towards higher or lower things is
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constituted by our higher-order volitions, our responsibility for the character of our will requires the liberty to form different volitional identifications
or reflexive commitments themselves. The moral worth and/or culpability
of "character" in this sense must be distinguished from mere praise or
blame for particular outward actions. The good will is a great or infinite
good according to Augustine's criteria precisely because its liberty saves the
person's inner character from being determined by fate or fortune alone:
their good second-order will "cannot be stolen or taken away from them
against their will."31 This will cannot be determined by any "natural" necessity if it is to be culpable when it identifies with inordinate desires. 32
It is important to emphasize that such a libertarian account of volitional
identification does not imply that the past has no effect on what options are
open to the agent's higher-order wilt or on how easily she may change her
current volitional commitments. Just as our habits of first-order motivation
may be tough to change, different possible higher-order volitions may be
more or less difficult for an agent to establish in herself. Augustine's account
does not require that the agent's alternatives in the higher-order will are
unlimited, but it does imply that a higher-order volition -as exemplified in
an upright will or an evil will- is never necessitated but rather remains one
among a morally significant range of alternative possible identifications that
are more or less accessible to us. Although the process through which one
of these live options becomes actual is not determined by past choices and
external causes,33 it may still be inclined or conditioned by such factors. 34
Thus, while Augustine's account benefits from Frankfurtian clarification, it
also requires its own unique and subtle version of libertarian freedom.
In sum, I have attributed to the early Augustine a version of libertarianism according to which liberum arbitrium in the higher-order will is essential to responsibility for our character first of all, and derivatively for our
particular actions. This is a development of the traditional interpretation of
Augustine's view. For example, explaining the distinction between liberum
arbitrium and libertas or "higher freedom," Vernon Bourke writes:
The former is a part of man's created nature: the soul is endowed at
birth with the ability to tum towards or away from its supreme good;
this ability is liberum arbitriwn. It implies a freedom of alternatives: to
do what is good or what is evil. On the other hand, God may so dispose the human will that it inclines only toward its true good. This
divine disposition would free the will from its tendency toward evil;
such eminent freedom is libertas. 35
To this I have added Augustine's implicit recognition of liberum arbitrium
in the higher-order will. However, both Augustine's understanding of
grace and predestination, and his attempted answer to the dilemma of
freedom and divine foreknowledge, naturally raise questions about
whether it is right to attribute such a libertarian theory to Augustine. For
example, David Hunt has argued that already in On Free Choice of the Will,
Augustine endorses a conception of divine foreknowledge that makes our
future choices temporally necessary, rejecting libertarian freedom as a
requirement for moral responsibility.36 Since the main goal of this article is
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to assess the challenge that a hierarchical libertarianism poses for
Frankfurt's account, for the moment I will simply assume that I have
described Augustine's early view correctly. But I hope to address these
important historical and exegetical questions in a planned follow-up article.

III. Freedom of the Will and Liberty of Identification
Like the early Augustine, in his first paper on the higher-order will,
Frankfurt considered the liberty to form different second-order volitions or
to change one's identifications to be part of "freedom of the will," which he
distinguishes from "freedom of action." But unlike Augustine, Frankfurt
never thought that moral responsibility requires a "free will" in his sense.
Instead, he gives a detailed compatibilist account of freedom of action,
which he thinks is sufficient for an agent to be responsible for a particular
act. Roughly speaking, an agent exhibits "freedom of action" in
Frankfurt's sense if he does what he wants (no impediment blocks his firstorder motive from causing the intended act) and he does not have an
opposing second-order volition (i.e. he does not identify with an opposite
or incompatible first-order desire). By contrast, "When we ask whether a
person's will is free we are not asking whether he is in a position to translate his first-order desires into actions" (p.20). While freedom of action
concerns the relation of the first-order will to the behavior it tries to guide,
"freedom of the will" concerns the relation of second-order volitions to the
first-order motives with which they identify the agent. The primary condition for a free will is that her second-order volitions V2 are successful, or
bring it about that she acts upon the motives1 with which she identifies
through V2 (p.20). For instance, consider someone who acts out of nastiness towards a relative when he willsz to act of out kindness instead (p.22).
Because he is not moved by the sympathetic intention with which he identifies, "he finds himself a helpless or passive bystander to the forces that
move him," and thus he does not have a free will (p.22).
Free will in Frankfurt's sense requires more than just that the agent's
second-order volition agrees with his operative first-order desires, for in
cases like the willing addict "their coincidence is not his own doing but
only a happy chance" (p.20). Altering my example, suppose that just
before he meets his relative, our man finds a $100 bill; as a result, he is so
happy that his urge to be cruel to his relative dissipates. He will surely still
be somewhat disappointed with himself afterwards, since he knows that,
but for his lucky find, he would have been nasty against his true willz. In
an agent exercising free will, the agreement between higher and lowerorder will is not so dependent on luck.
Although he leaves this ambiguous in some passages, Frankfurt also
implies that freedom of the will requires more than just a hypothetical relation between acts of volitional identification and the agent's first-order
motives. Suppose that if agent S forms a higher-order volition V2 identifying with desire n, then it will successfully guide S to act on n. This is not
enough to ensure that S enjoys free will. If it were, then S could enjoy free
will without actually forming any second-order volitions, as long as they
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would be effective if formed. Then arguably even a wanton who lacked
the mental capacity to identify with first-order motives could exhibit free
will, as long as there was some logically possible world in which the wanton has enhanced mental capacities, would use them to form second-order
volitions, and these volitions would be effective in guiding his first-order
will?7 But Frankfurt insists that a wanton can neither have nor lack freedom of will in his sense -it cannot even be an issue for the wanton (p.21).
Thus freedom of the will requires more than hypothetical effectiveness of
possible higher-order volitions. The agent with free will must also have it
presently in her power to form higher-order volitions, a capacity that the
wanton lacks. Thus Frankfurt says:
A person's will is free only if he is free to have the will he wants. This
means that, with regard to any of his [first-order] desires, he is free
either to make that desire his [first-order] will or to make some other
desire his [first-order] will instead. Whatever his [first-order] will,
then, the will of the person whose will is free could have been otherwise;
he could have done otherwise than to constitute his [first-order] will
as he did (p.24, my italics).
Frankfurt focuses here on the availability of alternatives at the first-order
level, but the free-willed agent realizes these alternatives through her higher-order will. Her liberty to make either first-order desire OJa or OJb her
willI must then derive from her capacity to form either the volition V2a
identifying with Ola, or to form the volition V2b identifying with 01b. 38
Thus free will in Frankfurt's sense includes libertarian freedom to bring
about different higher-order volitions, or to change our identifications. 39
Let us call this special condition 'liberty of the higher-order will' or the
'freedom to identify otherwise.' A person enjoys this liberty when, without
requiring other changes in their present state as a precondition, he can form
anyone out of a significant range of possible higher-order volitions (or
identifications). Note that this higher-order liberty could be enjoyed by
itself, without the other condition involved in Frankfurtian freedom of the
wilL For example, although no crack-cocaine addict in the grip of compulsive desires enjoys Frankfurtian free will (since in the present, circumstances permitting, they will act on their craving for cocaine whether they
identify with it or not) they could still enjoy liberty of the higher-order will.
An addict enjoying such 'liberty of identification' is one who can make herself either a willing or an unwilling addict: although her will, is not free, since
she cannot actually refrain from acting on the addictive desire, she can
either identify with this desire or alienate it (by committing herself to
oppose it and trying to find ways to overcome it). Again, these alternatives
may not be equally available to the agent, but she has more or less liberty in
the higher-order will depending on the range of second-order volitions
open to her, and how easy or difficult they may be to form.
Now this sort of scenario in which an agent enjoys liberty of identification but lacks full freedom of the will is familiar from Augustine's influential account of the bondage of sin. Admittedly, Augustine did not always
clearly separate this liberty of the higher-order will from the ability to be
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free from inordinate desire in our first-order will. Thus when he argues
that "the mind must be more powerful than cupidity"40 and so must be
able to resist acting on inordinate desire, Augustine gives the appearance
of clashing with Frankfurt's modern view that an unwilling addict, for
example, can actually be coerced by physiological need to desire a drug.
Yet in his own account of the volitional state of "difficulty" that results
from first sin, Augustine in fact cites many similar experiences where we
are "held back by some sort of necessity of carnal desire" which prevents
us from acting on the very motives! that we wilh to act on.4! To experience
this as volitional difficulty, however, we have to be able to decide for ourselves not to consent to or identify with these inordinate desires: though our
higher-order will may be too weak to control which desires we act on, we
still control our higher-order will.
Because for Augustine we can be responsible not only for acquiring a
good will but also for first sin ---or the initial turning away from God that
subjects us to later volitional difficulties- the range of alternative possible
higher-order volitions that we can form must (at least initially) be a morally rich one. Significant freedom of the will must include the ability to identify with either ethically appropriate or unethical motives for acting. Thus
Augustine argues that the human will is originally in a "state intermediate
between wisdom and folly" and able to move itself in either direction; only
for this reason is the person's whole character subject to moral categories. 42
Moreover, Augustine takes on faith that it was by an original exercise of
this capacity to sin that we lost a stronger power of the will:
But to accept falsehoods as truths, thus erring unwillingly; to struggle
against the pain of carnal bondage and not be able to refrain from acts
of inordinate desire: these do not belong to the nature that human
beings were created with .... [W]hen we speak of the free will to act
rightly, we mean the will which human beings were created withY
In paradise, human beings would have had something like full freedom of

the will in Frankfurt's sense, enabling them to exercise complete control
over the first-order motives on which they act. But this ability is lost
through an initial sin in the higher-order will itself. Nevertheless, every
human being still retains the residual freedom, or higher-order liberty, to
turn back to God,+! or to identify with morally upright motives for action
because they are ordinat~ven if this inward rectitudo cannot effectively
control our fallen first-order wills without divine assistance.

IV. Moral Responsibility for Character: Augustine's Challenge to Frankfurt
In light of these similarities between Augustine and Frankfurt, it becomes
clear why Augustine's early account of the conditions of moral responsibility
poses an important challenge to Frankfurt. Frankfurt holds that neither "free
will" in his sense nor liberty of the higher-order will alone are necessary for
responsibility for one's actions, while Augustine (at least in his earlier works)
holds that liberty of the higher-order will is required. Like Frankfurt,
Augustine traces responsibility for outward actions to responsibility for
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higher-order volitions that identify us with the motives of those acts, but
unlike Frankfurt, Augustine thinks that liberty of identification is necessary
for us to be responsible for these higher-order volitions themselves.
As we saw, Augustine'S account (as I interpreted it) implies that we
have the liberty to identify either with good (or ordinate) desires or with
inordinate desires as the motives of our actions. Identifying with the former is a state of moral virtue while identifying with inordinate desire is the
original form of moral corruption, on Augustine's account. In other words,
Augustine links liberty of identification in the higher-order will with the
initial dual capacity for both moral worth and unworth in one's personality.
Liberty of identification is an original condition of moral responsibility for
one's inward volitional character, i.e. the character formed by long-term commitments or patterns in the higher-order will itself. 1his is to be distinguished from outward character, which consists in dispositions to act on various kinds of first-order motives, along with other familiar personalitytraits. The unwilling alcoholic, for example, may have what psychologists
call an 'addictive personality' in her outward character, but her inner character is formed in part by her commitment to self-reform.
According to Augustine, then, the moral worth of persons (as opposed to
the isolated values of their particular actions) depends directly on the
inward character made up of their enduring volitional identifications. The
unwilling addict, for example, has at least a residual virtue that the wanton
addict lacks. 45 But if the moral worth of our inner character is determined
by our persistent higher-order volitions (or our enduring pattern of commitments), then the higher-order will itself must enjoy some measure of libertarian freedom in forming these volitions: our identifications can count as
self-determined or as our own only if we could have identified otherwise.
Of course, Frankfurt and his philosophical heirs have distinguished selfdetermination and libertarian freedom (in its proper sense as dual voluntary control over multiple alternatives). But the Augustinian model insists
that these features converge at the highest level of the will, where it locates
ultimate responsibility, even if they can diverge at the more derivative levels of human agency.
Frankfurt agrees with Augustine that one acquires a volitional self for
which one is responsible precisely through authentic commitment to various desires or possible first-order motives. Thus the willing and unwilling
addict differ in their moral worth because of the difference in the value of
their volitional identifications. In a later paper, Frankfurt says that the person's self is constituted by the choices of higher-order will through which
she tries to form a coherent and stable volitional character: by incorporating some preference-rankings and radically rejecting others, we "create a
self out of the raw materials of inner life."46 The early Augustine's position
is similar. But because Frankfurt did not focus on the role identification
plays in determining the self's moral worth, he did not initially ask if the
agent had to be able to wilh otherwise when forming a higher-order volition for it to count as self-determined, or to constihlte an authentic identification. 47 Yet in a series of more recent papers, Frankfurt has explicitly
argued that we may be bound by what he calls "volitional necessities" in
which we cannot avoid some of the higher-order cares and commitments
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that define our true self.4B In his view, we are still responsible for these
decisive or wholehearted identifications, although it may have been
inevitable that we would develop them. Furthermore, responsibility for
these self-constituting commitments does not require the ability to change
them even indirectly: it may rather be volitionally impossible for us even to
question them, let alone to set out intentionally to change them. On this
view, such necessary identifications still count as self-determined because
they are expressions of our individual nature or personal essence.
By contrast, in On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine implicitly rejects any
such notion of a personal essence: he insists that because our volitional
identifications determine our moral worth, they must be generated
through a process in which the agent could have willed2 otherwise. Let us
call this the principle of alternative possibilities for inner character:
P AP-C. Moral responsibility for one's inner character requires liberty
of identification at the higher levels of the will, or in the capacity to
form the volitional commitments that define our deep self: the agent
is responsible for her higher-order volitions only if she could (at some
point in her past) have voluntarily formed other volitions at these
levels or voluntarily avoided her present identifications.
Although Augustine certainly offers no decisive proof of PAP-C, I think
this principle has strong intuitive appeal: most people's considered convictions will agree with PAP-C unless they are given strong reasons to alter
this intuition. But Frankfurt has not yet given us any such reasons to reject
PAP-C, although he and his followers have challenged other PAP-type
principles for actions, omissions, and their consequences.
The Tracing Defense of PAP-Co In general, the Frankfurtians have
employed several famous over-determination examples to argue that
agents can be responsible for something X (an action, its consequences, a
prior intention, or perhaps a decision) when they have brought X about
without interference, even though they could not have done otherwise.'9 I
have argued in a recent review of Fischer and Ravizza's book that the intuitive appeal of all such cases depends on a distinction between two elements: "one (R) which explains why the agent is responsible for X, and
another (1) which explains why X is inevitable," or why X could not have
been avoided.oo In such cases, R intuitively makes the agent responsible for
X even though X is inevitable, but only because we tacitly assume that the
agent meets whatever conditions are required to be responsible for R itself. I
would now add that, if it is to be plausible to everyone that the agent is
responsible for X, then (1) the R and I factors must not only separated, but
(2) distinguished in such a way that it is open to the audience to take the R-factor as avoidable or evitable. As a result, libertarians can respond to such cases
with what I call a tracing defense: they can say that in order to be responsible
for R, the agent had to be able to avoid R, and thus responsibility for X still
ultimately requires libertarian freedom. Any attempt to answer such a
tracing defense with revised over-determination examples will require
cases in which both the R and X-element are inevitable, and the libertarian
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can hold that the agent is not responsible in such cases. For in such cases,
the agent will be responsible not only in the actual sequence, but also in the
counterfactual sequence, where R is caused by the external i-factor. Thus
although Frankfurt-style examples may show that responsibility and
inevitability can be locally compatible, for the libertarian, this is possible
only because of the libertarian freedom which the agent enjoyed in bringing about the conditions that made her responsible for the X-element in the
case, even though X is inevitable due to quite separate i-conditions.
We can apply this pattern of analysis to Frankfurt's willing heroin addict
case. In this example, X is the taking of heroin, i is the physiological addiction or compulsive disorder that makes refraining from available heroin virtually impossible, and R is the agent's identification with his addictive craving, or his second-order will to remain an addict. The willing addict indeed
seems responsible for taking his heroin, even though he could not do otherwise. This intuition depends on the plausible assumption that he is responsible for his second-order volition itself. Given the structure of this case,
Frankfurt must make this assumption, but he cannot defend or analyze its
conditions within the example: rather, it must be presupposed for the example
to seem persuasive.51 Moreover, the plausibility of the assumption that the
addict is responsible for his higher-order volition requires that we can
regard it as avoidable. So if the willing addict seems responsible for his
higher-order will, and thus for taking the drug, isn't that because we tacitly
imagine this addict as having liberty of identification, and thus as having
the volitional possibility of becoming an unwilling addict instead? Certainly
the early Augustine thought that, with God's help, he could have worked
this change in himself. I have found that undergraduates to whom I pose
the case routinely imagine the addict as freely deciding to identify with his
addictive desires rather than to alienate and fight them, and when questioned, they cite this presupposition in explaining their judgment that the
addict's willingness makes him responsible for taking the drug. If instead
we stipulate that the addict has been progmmmed to identify with and cultivate his cravings, or that he never had any other alternative higher-order
volition open to him, many people will find that their initial inclination to
hold him responsible for his addictive behavior evaporates. Because now
the R and X factors are both inevitable, and we cannot trace the agent's
responsibility for R to any prior condition R* which the agent did not
inevitably satisfy, we are no longer sure that the agent is responsible.
Rather, under these specifications, we doubt that his putative higher-order
volition is really the agent's own, or truly self-determined, or really expresses the volitional identifications constitutive of a deep self.
Let me clarify that this tracing model is only meant to be a defense of
PAP-C against familiar over-determination counterexamples to PAP-principles. It does not attempt to demonstrate on any independent grounds that
PAP-C is correct. Rather, it only seeks to show that, given their structure,
traditional over-determination cases leave libertarians free to hold PAP-C. I
have not attempted here to answer objections to P AP-C that do not rely on
Frankfurt-style cases,52 or to refute any rival compatibilist accounts of
responsibility for our volitional identifications (for example, Frankfurt's
neo-Leibnizian notion of personal essences, or Fischer and Ravizza's actual-
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sequence account of "takilJ~ responsibility" for the psychological processes
that explain our actions). Those antecedently disposed to prefer such
semi-compatibilist accounts will have to ask themselves how much their
disposition depends on the judgment that traditional Frankfurt-style cases
are clear defeaters of PAP-type principles, for my argument does undermine this judgment. But I provide no direct defeaters of the semi-compatibilist theories here. 54 Rather, I have only argued that PAP-C cannot be
defeated by traditional over-determination cases.
Comparison to Kane's Analysis. It is important to note that the extension
of libertarian conditions on moral freedom by tracing principles has
already been pioneered by Robert Kane. Kane's theory is a highly sophisticated development of Aristotle's earliest tracing theory: "if a man is
responsible for wicked acts issuing from his character, then he must at
some time in the past have been responsible for forming this character,"
where such responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise in choices
that helped create this character. 55 In particular, Kane adds to the alternative-possibilities requirement what he calls the "condition of ultimate
responsibility, or UR."56 Kane's UR is a complex tracing version of PAP:
the first part (R) defines "personal responsibility" for an event or state as
requiring that the agent could have avoided something that causally contributed to the event or state, and the second part (U) says that
for every X and Y (where X and Y represent occurrences of events or
states) if the agent is personally responsible for X, and if Y is an arche
(or sufficient ground or cause or explanation) for X, then the agent
must also be personally responsible for y's7
UR embodies one kind of libertarian tracing theory, because it entails "that
some actions in an agent's life history must satisfy AP" (the condition of
alternative possibilities), although not every free and responsible act must
satisfy AP,5R and its ultimacy condition requires that the agent be responsible for any actualized sufficient condition of any act imputable to him. The
idea is clearly that responsibility for some X traces to responsibility for any
actual state of affairs sufficient for X. S9
This is obviously somewhat different from the tracing defense I have
sketched above, since my defense does not require that if the agent is
responsible for some action A, then she is responsible for all actualized sufficient conditions for A, including the obtaining of any condition that
makes A inevitable. 60 Rather, it traces responsibility for inevitable actions
and decisions to states of the higher-order will, which Kane would include
in our character. Thus my tracing approach can be used directly against
traditional (non-global) Frankfurt-style cases, whereas Kane's principle is
not tailored specifically for this purpose. Hence in The Significance of Free
Will, Kane does not argue that in traditional counterfactual-intervener
examples, the agent is responsible for an X which he also cannot avoid, yet
only because this responsibility ultimately traces to a libertarian source.
While his restricted libertarian theory of ultimate responsibility certainly
encourages such a move, Kane sees that it does not as obviously answer
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global Frankfurt-style cases. Instead he argues, like Carl Ginet and David
Widerker, that in cases in which the actual sequence is indeterministic (so
as not to beg the question against incompatibilists), the agent can avoid the
X for which she is responsible. In particular, the indeterministic choices in
which ultimate responsibility terminates cannot be rendered inevitable by
a Frankfurt-controller.61
But this Ginet-Kane-Widerker approach has been challenged by several
new cases, including Eleonore Stump's argument that "any mental act,
even an act of willing, is correlated with a neural state which is not indivisible," although earlier portions of this neural sequence do not cause the
act. 62 Although Stewart Goetz and others have attempted to answer
Stump, I think it may be better and more powerful to begin with the tracing defense against traditional Frankfurt-style cases, and then to see
whether the sort of restricted libertarianism it implies can then shed light
on what is wrong in the global cases.63
However, the forms of restricted libertarianism consistent with my tracing defense will be similar to Kane's in many respects. In place of Kane's
(U) they would have the requirement that to be responsible for X, we must
be ultimately responsible for whatever conditions are sufficient for us to be
responsible for X. In place of Kane's (R), they would have the thesis that
ultimate responsibility for some state S, which is not traceable to prior
responsibility for anything else, requires being able voluntarily to avoid S.
When spelled out, these models will also entail Kane's conclusion that if
ultimate responsibility must terminate in some state that is undeniably
attributable to us, or by its very nature imputable to us, only a state originating from libertarian choice with dual or plural volLmtary control can satisfy
this condition. The Augustinian model I sketched above is one especially
appealing version of such a restricted libertarianism, since it involves the
transfer of responsibility via higher-order volitions, by which we may
become responsible even for actions that we could not avoid causing. 64
V. A Rejoinder to Frankfurt

In his response to a much earlier and shorter conference version of this
essay, Frankfurt asked why we should think that the conditions of responsibility for inner character should be any different than the conditions of
responsibility for particular actions. Surely, he said, it is "far more reasonable to presume that the basic structural conditions for moral responsibility
are the same in every type of case."65 So if we can be responsible for acting
on a given first-order desire even when we cannot do or desire, otherwise,
then likewise, we can probably be responsible for a volitional identification
formed in the higher-order will even when we could not wilb otherwise.
Frankfurt's suggestion is that there is a natural analogy between responsibility for these different elements of agency: If so, then such hierarchical or
order-symmetry would be the natural presumption. Thus by contrast,
hierarchical asymmetry in any theory of moral responsibility will be ad hoc,
unless that theory can give us special new reasons to think (against our
alleged natural presumption) that asymmetry is the best explanation of
available evidence.
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The libertarian rejoinder to this argument should now be evident. Even
on Frankfurt's own view, the conditions of responsibility for particular outward (or non-reflexive) acts and responsibility for volitional identification
are not structurally similar, because responsibility for outward actions
traces (at least in part) to responsibility for volitional character and for the
reflexive activities that constitute it. The hierarchical asymmetry in the
Augustinian model builds on this crucial structural distinction: in this
model, (1) responsibility for a particular outward act may exist even when
the act is inevitable, but only because the responsibility flows from a higherorder volition through which the agent identifies with that act. Yet (2)
responsibility for volitional identification itself does not trace to other psychic states or processes with their own distinct conditions of imputability,
since this is where 'the buck stops.' This is just to say that the higher-order
will (or some part of it) is a source of ultimate responsibility in Kane's
sense. (3) Hence inevitability and responsibility cannot be made compatible for the higher-order will in the way they are rendered compatible at the
level of outward actions and their first-order motives. (4) Finally, note that
we could add further tracing conditions at this level, if we think that sufficient persistence in our higher-order volitions or sufficient commitment of
the will can 'fix' our identifications or make them impossible for us to
change in the future. 66 Of course, this does not show that compatibilists
cannot offer competing accounts of responsibility for volitional identifications. But it does show that the order-asymmetry of the early Augustinian
theory is hardly ad hoc, since it is just a specific instantiation of the structural asymmetry that we must find in any tracing theory (including compatibilist ones) between conditions of local responsibility for elements covered
by tracing principles, and conditions of ultimate responsibility for those
final elements to which all responsibility traces. Nor is the burden of proof
on libertarians to demonstrate that the hierarchical asymmetry permitted
by PAP-C is better than any conceivable compatibilist explanation of our
experience and our moral concepts. Rather, we only have to show that
hierarchical asymmetry has a clear and logical rationale in the elegant
structure of an unrefuted theory with a respectable historical pedigree,
which for most people will sufficiently explain all the relevant available
evidence. We have made some progress in showing this much.
Pace Frankfurt, then, its hierarchical asymmetry is not by itself any prima
facie evidence against the liberty of identification model. Hence the tracing
libertarian can safely hold that, although examples like the willing addict
show that responsibility may be locally compatible with inevitability for
outward actions, this does not apply by analogy to the very volitional identifications that make such local compatibility possible. To think that we
can simply generalize from such local compatibility is to miss the insight of
the tracing theory that there is a crucial disanalogy between levels of the
will: if a person is responsible for acting on inordinate desires even when
they cannot do otherwise, but only because the person was committed to
these first-order dispositions by her higher-order volitions, then this still
leaves an open question about the conditions of responsibility for these volitions themselves. Plausible Frankfurt-style cases necessarily accommodate
the fact that ultimate responsibility for the most central activities of human
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agency can have conditions quite different from the conditions of derivative responsibility for lower elements of our agency.
Moreover, starting from the libertarian intuition embodied in PAP-C, we
should expect to find another closely related asymmetry: even if the actual
causal history of the first-order motive that explains an action may not always
by itself determine the agent's responsibility for that action (e.g. if the agent
identifies with a motive derived from external causes), yet the causal history
of higher-order volitions may well be crucial in determining the conditions
of responsibility for volitional identifications themselves. How such volitions are formed in the higher-order will may be essential to their special significance as carriers of the agent's identification. Since agents are by definition responsible for their volitional identifications, such a volitional attitude
may not count as an identification (or as a self-determined expression of our
long-term goals, ends, and values) unless it has the right kind of causal history, e.g. perhaps being brought about by a process of practical reasoning
involving libertarian choice or agent-causation, or some other incompatibilist
moment.
If the hierarchical tracing model with its order-asymmetry is established
as an intelligible option that embodies P AP-C, we might ask why rival
compatibilist accounts of responsibility for the higher-order will should
still have any appeal, even if incompatibilists cannot find decisive defeaters
for them? Since today the fear that future physics could describe our
world as a deterministic system seems rather remote (especially given the
successes of Superstring Theory) I think the compatibilist accounts will
seem forced unless their defenders can actually refute P AP-C. For example, without such a refutation, why would we accept, as Frankfurt has
asserted, that a person can be programmed to form the identifications he
does, thus taking responsibility for various desires even though he could
not have done otherwise than to identify with them or take responsibility
for them?67 In his response to my paper, Frankfurt reiterated this thesis:
Whatever mental acts are required to accomplish the acceptance in
which identification consists, a person may be morally responsible
for performing those acts even if he could not have done otherwise
than to perform them. There is no reason why it should be any more
essential for an agent to have alternatives to these acts [which constitute an identification], in order to be morally responsible for them,
than it is essential for morally responsible agents to have alternatives
to acts of other sorts. 68
But, given my above analysis, I do not see how Frankfurt could try to convince anybody to agree with this assertion if (like most people) they start
with the presumption that PAP-C is correct. Again, I do not attempt here
to demonstrate that Frankfurt's assertion is incorrect, but I have shown
that he is wrong to think that his examples against familiar unrestricted
PAP-principles legitimize any presumption that P AP-C is probably also
false. Traditional (non-global) Frankfurt-style cases neither falsify PAP-C
nor ground the least doubt of its truth. And since for most people, the
presumption remains on the side of PAP-C unless it can be refuted, the
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burden of argument is thus on Frankfurtians to provide quite different
counterexamples against PAP-C itself.
In that effort they will face the following dilemma: (1) either their counterexample will depend on highly controversial inevitability-making conditions to ensure that the agent identifies as she does in the actual scenario,
such as hard knowledge of what an agent's future decisions will be,69 or (2)
it will no longer preserve the difference between the R factors in the actual
sequence that make the agent responsible for her identification, and the I
factors that render it inevitable, in such a way that responsibility for R can
be avoided. In the latter case, I have argued that libertarians need not
grant the fundamental premise in traditional counterexamples to PAP,
namely that the agent remains responsible for her activity.
A final example may help to clarify this problem for Frankfurtians.. The
film Leaving Las Vegas features Benjamin, a willing addict (played by
Nicholas Cage), and while we pity him, most viewers probably blame him
for identifying with his alcoholism. 70 But would we feel the same if we
were told that Benjamin could not have done otherwise, because if he had
not decided to quit his job and throw himself unreservedly into pursuit of
death through drink, a counterfactual intervener would have made him
form the higher-order volition expressed in these decisions? Call this case
FY (for Frankfurtian-Vegas). Since the counterfactual intervener played no
role in the actual sequence, should we say that in FY, Benjamin is responsible for his higher-order will, because he formed it on his own? Perhaps
this will seem plausible until we ask: how does this differ from the intervener's causing him to form his volitional identification, as would happen if
Benjamin failed to form it by a certain time, or began before then to tum
towards becoming an unwilling addict?
As Fischer and others have repeatedly emphasized in rejoinder to flickerof-freedom defenses of PAP, in traditional Frankfurt-style cases, there is an
important asymmetry between the actual and counterfactual sequences: the
agent is /lot responsible for what she does in the counterfactual sequence,
because it does not amount to an action at all (instead, it is an unintentional
movement).?! Even in cases where the countedactual intervener supposedly
causes a decision or an intention to act, the 'action' in the counterfactual
sequence is still not voluntary, and the Frankfurtian cannot not hold the
agent responsible for it without begging the question against incompatibilism. But now, in FY, we are supposed to imagine that the counterfactual
intervener will cause a state of volitional identification to arise in our agent.
According to the tracing theory, and Frankfurt himself, the agent is eo ipso
responsible for any such state of his inner character: this must be the case for
responsibility to transfer through this state to other first-order motives. So
FY asks us to imagine that an intervener can cause the very same state for
which the agent is responsible in the actual sequence. Thus in FV, the
required asymmetry between actual and counterfactual sequences is lost: in
both, Benjamin must be responsible for his higher-order volition. As a result,
FY simply begs the question against the incompatibilist. So the Augustinian
tracing-defender need not countenance that FY is even a possible scenario.
Thus anyone beginning from PAP-C and then reflecting on these cases
would be justified in concluding that in a scenario in which we can no longer
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trace the compulsive agent's responsibility to a volitional commitment or
identification that he could have voluntarily avoided, it would be unfair to
consider him responsible for his fate.
If some non-philosopher NP (whose intuitions aren't shaped by explicit
prior theoretical baggage) still did feel inclined to blame Benjamin for identifying with alcoholism, even though a counterfactual intervener was standing
by to make Benjamin so identify, NP's attitude would probably be due to her
tacit assumption that in the counterfactual sequence, the artificially created
second-order desire to cultivate alcoholic cravings would not count as the
agent's own, or as an identification for which he has taken responsibility. In
other words, NP would be reinterpreting the FV case so that in the counterfactual sequence, Benjamin only acquires some simulacrum of volitional identification with his desire for alcohol. In this alternative version of FV, the
intervener cannot really make Benjamin into a willing addict without his
consent. In this form, FV would include the required asymmetry between
actual and counterfactual sequences, and thus would not beg the question
against incompatibilists. But in this form, FV also leaves PAP-C intact. For
now Benjamin can voluntarily avoid identifying with his alcoholism by
deciding on his own not to identify with it in the counterfactual sequence.

VI. Conclusion
So far, it seems that the tracing version of restricted libertarianism resists traditional Frankfurtian counterarguments. But two important questions
remain to be addressed. First, do Augustine's mature or final views about
freedom, Christian justification, and the human relationship with God
undermine the sort of theory I've sketched here? In a sequel to this paper, I
hope to defend the thesis that, while Augustine did change his views following the Pelegian controversy, his own earlier approach remains superior.
Second, quite apart from theological concerns, can the proponent of restricted libertarianism extend the tracing defense of PAP-C to so-called 'global'
Frankfurt-style cases, in which the agent never had the power to do otherwise at any point in the past, but still apparently acted without outside interference in the actual sequence? There are now several kinds of these cases,
some of which involve complex problems. But the present paper has at least
shown that to be fully global, such cases will have to include the higher-order
will. Yet as we have seen, if the higher-order will is made inevitable by some
series of interveners, then they must have the power to cause an agent to
form a volitional state for which she is necessarily responsible, a state such
that responsibility is essentially built into it. And it is hard to see how this
could be stipulated without begging the main question that will divide libertarians and non-libertarians over PAP-c.
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Division meeting of the American Philosophical Foundation (Atlanta, GA:
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response, and for other reactions and advice in earlier correspondence.
2. Frankfurt, "Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," Journal
of Philosophy, 66 no. 23 (December, 1969) and "Freedom of the Will and the
Concept of a Person," Journal of Philosophy, 68 no. 1 (January, 1971); both
reprinted in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge University
Press, 1984).
3. Moreover, of the two philosophers who have connected Augustine and
Frankfurt, Eleonore Stump and David Hunt both hold that moral responsibility
only requires a form of incompatibilist freedom that does not require true libertarian (or alternate-possibilities) freedom. David Hunt bases his hyper-incompatibilist account of moral freedom on global overdetermination cases, some of
which he derives from Augustine's own work on divine foreknowledge.
4. See Davenport, Review of Responsibility and Control, by John M. Fisher
and Mark Ravizza, S.J. (Cambridge University Press, 1998), in Faith and
Philosophy 17 no. 3 Guly 2000): 384-395.
5. All references to Frankfurt's "Freedom of the Will" paper will be given
parenthetically by page number in The Importance of What We Care About.
6. So understood, "alienation" is simply the negative correlate of identification. The unwilling addict alienates the first-order desire (a craving for
drugs) on which he nevertheless acts. That craving still becomes his first-order
will in Frankfurt's sense, meaning that it determines the intention through
which we would explain the addict's behavior as a particular type of action
(e.g. 'getting high' rather than 'taking medication for an illness'). Thus his 'getting high' constitutes an intentional action, guided by his own understanding
of what he was doing: it is not involuntary, like sleepwalking. But nevertheless, the very intention that makes this an act of 'getting high' is in a deeper
sense against his inner will, or alien to his self.
7. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, tr. Thomas Williams (Hackett,
1993), Book III, §1, p.72.
8. In the thirty years following Frankfurt's 1971 paper, many critiques
have made it clear that his initial analysis of volitional identification in terms of
a kind of second-order "desire" was too simple. Frankfurt originally conceived
second-order volitions as simply one kind of iterated desire: a "desire to desire
to X." But identification must consist in more than such an iterated preference
or pro-attitude, because even complex preferences can be 'alienated' from the
agent. Moreover, to avoid regress objections, the higher-order act that constitutes identification must be differently characterized to make clear why it too
does not require endorsement or acceptance from some yet-higher order attitude to make it the agent's own. For details see my Ph.D. thesis, Self and Will
(University of Notre Dame, 1998). But these concerns, which are central to the
problem of explaining autonomy, are not crucial for the topics of this paper.
9. Augustine, Free Choice of the Will, Book I, §4, pp. 7-8. As a result, he
says, "All wicked people, just like good people, desire to live without fear,'" but
the wicked desire to possess securely or without fear goods that are essentially
dependent on contingency, such as continued biological life: thus someone
who murders another in fear of them "desires to live without fear" (p.6) but
applies this desire to a good for which it is 'inordinate,' such as physical wellbeing. If this seems to imply that killing in self-defense would be murder,
Augustine says that in such cases we can act for the sake of the principle
(which is not subject to moral luck) that "it is much worse for someone unwillingly to suffer a sexual assault, than for the assailant to be killed by the one he
was going to assault" (p.8). Acting on this motive would be ordinate.
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10. The idea behind the concept of "inordinate desire" seems to be that
anything whose possession and enjoyment is temporary or otherwise substantially dependent on luck can have intrinsic value, but only of a lower order
than the value of the different virtues. Inordinate desire is a willingness to pursue these lower values at the cost of the higher values. It is unnatural to value
such luck-dependent goods so much that we are willing to commit injustices in
the pursuit of them. Still, the idea that luck-dependence by itself places something's value on a lower order than qualities of character that are not luckdependent involves a Stoic attitude that not everyone will endorse.
11. Augustine, Free Choice of the Will, Book I, §11, p.l7. Augustine arrives at
this conclusion by an elimination argument. He has already argued that a
divine power, which is superior to the changeable mind and will distinctive of
persons, would not compel us to act on an evil motive, and that no power inferior in nature to our minds and will can make them "slave to inordinate
desire" (p.17). Therefore by elimination, it can only be our own will that does
it. Of course, given our contemporary knowledge of physical addictions, we
might want to qualify Augustine's claim today.
12. Ibid, Book III, §17, p.104.
13. Ibid, pp.104-5.
14. Ibid, §25, p.121.
15. Ibid, §24, p.120.
16. Ibid, §25, p.122.
17. It seems that Carlos Steele misses this aspect of Augustine's account in
his otherwise brilliant essay, "Does Evil Have a Cause? Augustine's Perplexity
and Thomas's Answer," Review of Metaphysics 48 no.2 (December 1994): 251-73.
But he is correct that Augustine's own example of stealing the pears "seems to
undermine the fundamental premise of Thomas's philosophy of action, namely that nobody loves sin and evil for themselves" (p.268). At least, it seems that
the human person is capable of valuing evil intrinsically as an expression of
absolute denial of others, as a way of trying to reject our nature as beings
already responsible for others.
18. St. Augustine, On the Trinity, Book X 11.18, reprinted in The Essential
Augustine, 2nd Ed., ed. Vernon J. Bourke (Hackett Publishing, 1974): p.77 (my
italics). In the next sentence, Augustine adds that "nothing is so much in the
memory as memory itself"-which parallels his earlier claim about the reflexivitv of will.
i9. Augustine, Free Choice of the Will, Book I, §12, pp.19-20.
20. Ibid, Book I, §12, p.19.
21. In Kant, the only difference is that Augustine's eudaimonistic criterion
for good first-order intentions and desires is replaced by formal universalizability tests for the moral acceptability of the "maxim of the act" or the firstorder will involved in the action qua action.
22. Augustine, Free Choice of the Will, Book I, §14, pp.23-24.
23. Bonnie Kent traces the history of this fundamental Augustinian idea
through medieval philosophy in the 13th century, culminating with Duns
Scotus's distinction between the will to happiness and the will to righteousness. See Kent, Virtues of the Will (Catholic University of America Press, 1995).
24. Ibid, Book I, §11, p.18. In the dialogue, it seems incredible to Evodius
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